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THE FEMINIST ACADEMIC’S CHALLENGE 
TO LEGAL EDUCATION:  
CREATING SITES FOR CHANGE 
Ann Shalleck 
While a few pioneering women legal academics inhabited 
law schools and throughout the 20th century sporadically 
challenged the pervasive male domination of legal education, 
legal feminism did not begin to flourish in law schools until the 
1980s. Drawing on broader feminist efforts to transform 
academia, feminist law teachers, students, and activists began 
questioning not only the content of the material included in the 
curriculum that dominated legal education, but also the nature of 
scholarly inquiry and analysis, the assumptions underlying 
pedagogical methods, the gendered components of the culture 
that dominated legal education, and the daily practices that 
characterized law schools, both in and out of the classroom. 
From these initial efforts to bring the second wave of feminism 
into law schools and legal thought, legal feminists generated vast 
and enduring change. For more than thirty years, Clare Dalton 
contributed to creating a vibrant movement that has sustained 
succeeding waves of innovative and diverse forms of feminist 
legal thought and pedagogy. These early feminist academics, 
such as Clare, challenged prevailing ideas, pervasive norms, and 
entrenched structures of power. Often greeted with hostility, 
their efforts needed strength, flexibility, and creativity. Clare 
                                                          
 Professor of Law and Carrington Shields Scholar, American University, 
Washington College of Law. This essay is based on the presentations I and 
others made at Challenging Boundaries in Legal Education, A Symposium 
Honoring Clare Dalton’s Contributions as a Scholar and Advocate held at 
Northeastern University School of Law on November 5, 2010. Many thanks 
to Anna-Kristina Fox and Brittany Ericksen who provided expert research 
assistance and valuable insight. 
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worked with others to develop multiple sites within legal 
academia—in scholarship, in teaching, and in curricular design—
where legal academic feminism could flourish. She built upon 
and expanded understanding of the gendered nature of law, 
deployed forms of critical legal analysis that illuminated the 
dynamics of gender within the structures of legal thought, 
brought issues that implicated the operation of gender in society 
and law into the classroom, and implemented an innovative 
model of clinical education that enabled students to act as 
lawyers in ways that engaged the experiences of women and 
sought to accomplish change.  
Clare appeared as an explicitly feminist legal academic early 
in this development. When I started the Women and the Law 
Program at American University, Washington College of Law in 
1984, Clare already appeared to me and to other feminist 
academics as an established and respected scholar.1 With so few 
women and far fewer feminist professors in this period of rapid 
change, when the span of each generation was remarkably short, 
we beheld Clare as a senior colleague (although only an 
Assistant Professor) who revealed vistas that we had only 
incompletely imagined. She identified herself, however, not as 
the exceptional woman forging her own distinctive path, but as a 
friend akin to us, someone with the courage and confidence to 
help us all be stronger in our commitment to and better in our 
ability to bring feminist insight and practice to law. Her work, 
in its brilliance and originality and its urge to reach across 
disciplines and find new ways of understanding gender, was our 
work—a project that could undergird and foster our own nascent 
efforts. It could help in our resistance to demands and impulses 
to replicate dominant models for achieving success within 
existing academic terms. With our collective strength, 
                                                          
1 This essay proceeds, as do others in this volume, from an explicitly 
situated perspective. Some of us have taken the opportunity presented by this 
symposium to reflect upon the history of feminism in legal academia, a 
history we were active in creating, through reflection upon Clare Dalton’s 
contribution to that history. Therefore, in important respects, this essay 
contains certain characteristics of memoir as I (and others) interrogate how 
our experiences as participants in these developments influenced the history 
of legal education and the history of feminist change.  
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determination, and expansive vision, we felt through Clare the 
possibility and excitement of transformation.  
This essay chronicles Clare’s contributions to the creation of 
a feminism that was able to challenge and reconstitute the legal 
academy. Part I describes how her ground-breaking approach to 
contract theory encouraged others to apply different kinds of 
feminist critiques to fundamental assumptions underlying legal 
doctrine, expanding the range of feminist critiques of law 
beyond many of the initial efforts that often focused on questions 
regarding the legal concept and meaning of equality.2 Part II 
recounts Clare’s attempts to reform law teaching and the law 
school curriculum. While scholarship was a mark of legitimacy 
for the legal academic, in the curriculum and teaching practices, 
feminist academics had to learn how to have their new legal 
understandings take root and gain acceptance in the daily life 
and institutional structures of the academy, particularly as 
transmitted to students. Through the Women’s Rights and the 
Law School Curriculum workshop, Clare and other colleagues 
helped to fashion the beginnings of a first-year curriculum that 
recognized and even embraced feminist perspectives, including 
initiatives such as teaching torts with the recognition of domestic 
violence as a fundamental violation of the obligations in 
relationships among people. Part III discusses Clare’s efforts to 
create institutions within law schools that united feminist theory 
and practice. In the founding of the Northeastern University 
School of Law’s Domestic Violence Institute, Clare moved from 
integrating feminist thought into traditional modes of legal 
pedagogy to transforming that pedagogy.  
I. BRINGING FEMINISM TO THE CENTER: DECONSTRUCTING 
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
During the early 1980s, Clare’s scholarship took on nothing 
                                                          
2 KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1–3 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that 
gender equality analysis focuses on the premise that individuals should be 
treated alike and generates challenges to law based on sex-based 
classifications). Formal equality constitutes only one of many feminist legal 
theories. 
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less than a critique of the basic assumptions underlying contract 
doctrine, using critical methodologies still largely unfamiliar to 
the legal academy. Her article, An Essay in the Deconstruction 
of Contract Doctrine,3 remains a classic to this day, bringing 
together methods from different critical traditions in philosophy, 
political thought, and literary analysis and drawing on feminist 
thought across disciplines.4 Just as she seeks in these traditions 
new ways to understand the operation of law and the activity of 
legal scholarship, her work reflects her purpose to understand 
women as they appear in law and whose lives law shapes. She 
explores how women are situated differently in relation to the 
materials of the law and to authority in interpretation of law. 
The treatment of women in law is at the center of her concerns. 
In describing her own goal in engaging in the deconstruction of 
doctrine, Clare declares, “my own first commitment is to assess 
how women are viewed and treated in legal contexts.”5 
To fully appreciate Clare’s contribution, we must situate her 
project within the context of the feminism that was beginning to 
establish itself within the legal academy and understand those 
efforts in light of the powerful resistance that a feminist 
presence and feminist legal thought encountered.6 While 
academic feminism was growing rapidly in some disciplines 
throughout the 1970s, law schools remained largely impervious 
or hostile to bringing feminist critical thinking to bear on legal 
thought and analysis. The intellectual breadth and sophistication 
of Clare’s scholarship reflected and furthered a broad feminist 
determination to open up intellectual terrain that could create 
space for understanding the relationship of law to gender. 
Concomitantly, her intellectual pursuits remained bound up with 
her aspiration to make feminist thought central to legal thought. 
She situated herself and her writing within the commitments of 
feminism. 
 In her stunningly ambitious project, An Essay in the 
                                                          
3 Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 
YALE L.J. 997 (1985). 
4 See id. at 1005–09. 
5 Id. at 1009 n.23. 
6 Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of 
Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1987-88). 
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Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, Clare elucidates the 
relationships among seemingly discrete intellectual frameworks 
for analyzing legal doctrine and legal thought, all of which she 
maintained directly and indirectly contributed to the development 
of feminist legal thought. She analyzes and critiques contract law 
by identifying three central recurring themes—the distinctions 
between the public and the private, subjective and objective 
understanding, and form and substance—that she argues drive 
selected doctrines across the field of contract law. The 
distinction between the public and the private becomes her frame 
for exploring the structure and development of the concepts of 
implied-in-law and quasi-contracts, as well as the doctrines of 
duress and unconscionability.7 The dichotomous understanding 
of subjective and objective viewpoints guides her analysis of 
contract formation, parol evidence, and mistake; in each of those 
areas doctrinal devices operate to favor objective over subjective 
interpretations of contracts.8 The wavering formulations of 
purported explanations of differences between form and 
substance propel her analysis of consideration and reliance. As 
form devolves into substance, doctrines that concern whether 
something has value and how that value is understood resurface 
questions of the objectivity of value and the uneasy distinction 
between the public and the private.9 
In her analysis of these three thematic dichotomies, Clare 
brings to bear critical methods and insights that highlight 
underlying structures of law. Most explicitly, her title announces 
her use of the methods of deconstruction in legal analysis.10 
                                                          
7 In these discrete areas of contract law doctrines, Clare identifies ways 
that the dominant conception of contract law as private is subverted by 
submerged concerns for the public that appear clearly in justifications for 
these seeming “deviations” from the law’s concern for private bargains. 
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1001.  
8 These devices are seen as a way to disguise how the existence of an 
objective way to understand what happens in a bargain is a threat to contract 
law’s claim that it is private, not public. Id. at 1001–02.  
9 Thus, as in the other areas, arguments about and within these intricate 
doctrinal formulations serve to displace questions about the public nature of 
seemingly private contract law and the instability of an objective realm of 
interpretation in ways that disguise fundamental questions. Id. at 1002.  
10 J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 
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Two aspects of deconstructive techniques appear in her work as 
most powerful. First, Clare draws upon analyses of the “role of 
conceptual duality” and its hierarchies of inclusion and power in 
critiquing contract doctrine.11 She identifies how legal doctrine 
attempts both to frame and resolve dualities (such as 
public/private, objective/subjective, and form/substance) in 
particular legal contexts, by favoring one pole of the duality over 
the other. The constructed dualities create forms of legal 
argumentation that, while seeming to generate determinate 
answers, actually disguise underlying problems of power and 
knowledge. This process submerges contradictions and 
inconsistencies in the creation of the duality in an attempt both to 
achieve stability for law and to disguise how the privileging of 
one pole can generate benefits for some at the expense of others. 
Second, the creation of the duality involves circularity. Clare 
shows that while each pole relies on the other for its meaning and 
each is unrecognizable without the other, law attempts through its 
doctrines to separate the opposing concepts from each other. The 
law treats one concept as fundamental or foundational and the 
other as secondary or supplemental to the first. Arguments within 
intricate doctrinal formulations serve to displace, and therefore to 
disguise, questions about the very nature of the duality, its 
hierarchical structure, and the questions it presents.12 
                                                          
743 (1987) (identifying methodological techniques and philosophical ideas 
from deconstruction that can illuminate how legal doctrines are formed and 
influenced by ideological thinking). 
11 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1007. Dalton analyzes how the “hierarchal 
relationship between the poles” of a duality produces a disfavored pole. 
While Dalton draws most explicitly on the work of Derrida and 
deconstructive methodologies within post-structuralism, a related strand of 
feminist thought goes back to Simone de Beauvoir. In the introduction to The 
Second Sex, de Beauvoir identifies her analysis of women’s situation as 
rooted in the operation of the duality of masculine and feminine: “[N]o group 
ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over 
against itself . . . . The Other is posed as such by the One in defining himself 
as the One. But if the Other is not to regain the status of being the One, he 
must be submissive enough to accept this alien point of view. Whence comes 
this submission in the case of woman?” SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND 
SEX, at xvii–xviii (H. M. Parshley trans. 1952) (1949).  
12 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1000–01, 1007–08. For example, in creating 
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Clare also draws upon other critical traditions in her 
analysis of three dichotomies that recur in contract law. She 
argues that liberal legalism—which posits abstract universal 
legal subjects who can freely interact with others without state 
interference, except that which protects them from the 
overreaching of others—also disguises what is at stake in the 
dichotomies between public and private, subjective and 
objective understanding, and form and substance. By 
constructing contract doctrines that assume the abstract 
universal legal subject in the creation of the lines that 
demarcate the boundaries between the poles of each duality, 
contract law disguises the structures of power that underlie the 
lives of the actual people implicated in each particular doctrinal 
formulation.13 In exploring her three thematic dualities, Clare 
shows how the doctrines reflect liberal legalism’s vision of the 
relationship of the individual to others and to the state, while 
also presenting forms of argumentation that legitimate 
underlying structures of power that allocate benefits within 
society. By revealing the underlying understandings of 
individuals, assumptions about their relationships to each other 
and to the state, and the forms of power disguised within 
doctrinal formulations and analysis, Clare provides academics 
and advocates with “a most sophisticated sense both of the 
array of available argument and of the limits of legal 
discourse.”14  
While other schools of legal critique, most notably legal 
realism, had long assaulted the orthodoxy of classical legal 
thought, none embraced the insights of the second wave of 
                                                          
a duality between the public and the private, and in valuing the private over 
the public in contract law, doctrines seek to make the private the norm and 
the public the deviation from, or the supplement to, the private. If questions 
about the actual public nature of seemingly private contract law become 
questions about the precise contours of specific doctrines such as 
unconscionability, then doctrinal formulations maintain the stability of the 
idea that contracts are private and disguise how fundamental questions of 
fairness are marginal to the interpretation of contracts. 
13 Id. at 1007. 
14 Id. at 1009. 
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feminist thought that emerged and matured outside law.15 Clare, 
however, integrates multiple forms of emergent feminist thought 
with other critical traditions. Her thematic analysis of the 
dichotomies of contract doctrines and her challenge to the 
abstract legal subjects who appear in the resulting doctrinal 
formulations present a feminist approach to confronting any area 
of legal doctrine. In critiquing “liberal political theory and legal 
liberalism,”16 Clare demonstrates how liberal legal thought posits 
a universal (rather than particular) and abstract (as opposed to 
contextualized) vision of individuals and relationships and, 
thereby, evades the conversation about “how we should conceive 
relationships between people” and “how we should understand 
and police the boundary between self and other.”17 Her critique, 
which reflects the feminist discomfort with the abstract, isolated 
individual as the central figure in liberal legal thought,18 calls for 
careful and sustained attention in each doctrinal area to the 
“concrete aspects of social life.”19 Further, Clare highlights how 
the abstraction disguises “how a legal order . . . can still operate 
to exclude important constituencies from the benefits available 
within the society.”20 This exclusion makes the experiences of 
women, however situated, invisible or indistinguishable from 
those of men even when social reality makes the differences in 
experiences critical to understanding how law does and could 
operate. Abstract doctrines, when applied in particular legal and 
social contexts, distort understanding of women’s participation in 
society or work to exclude them from crucial spheres of life.  
                                                          
15 Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 
493, 500–08 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). 
16 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1005–06. 
17 Id. at 1006. 
18 For example, while many legal feminists criticized law for treating 
individuals differently based on their gender, other feminists questioned the 
limits of an equality analysis that could not reach structural inequalities 
between men and women. Debates about formal equality versus substantive 
equality and multiple efforts to transcend the debate dominated much feminist 
legal theory of this period. See Dalton, supra note 6. 
19 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1001–03. 
20 Id. at 1007. 
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In the task of deconstruction, Clare also makes feminist 
insight central.21 The themes she chooses for organizing her 
process of deconstructing contract doctrine permeated the 
resurgent second wave of feminism thought within which Clare 
wrote. Two paradigmatic examples from different disciplines 
illustrate how Clare’s study of contract law reflected 
developments altering vast fields of inquiry and drew upon 
methods of analysis and themes that appear in the path-breaking 
work of others. In philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir’s pioneering 
work, The Second Sex, analyzed women’s experience through 
the hierarchal duality of man/woman.22 In history, feminist 
historians explored the development of separate spheres ideology 
in the nineteenth century, revealing ways of thinking and 
structures relationships that marked off the public from the 
private and treated women’s feelings as distinct from men’s 
knowledge.23 Clare’s thematic choices reflect the feminist 
consciousness of the time and contributed to its expansion into 
legal academia. 
In addition, the article brings a distinctive technique to the 
methodology of deconstruction: while her deconstructive 
methods draw upon the work of Derrida, her accounts of 
binaries within law take the form of stories.24 This mode of 
analysis reflects the emergent feminist focus on storytelling that 
crossed disciplinary boundaries. Clare describes her scholarly 
deconstructive project as reshaping the telling of law’s stories. 
She begins her article with an invocation of this project: “[l]aw, 
                                                          
21 Id. at 1009 n.23 (“[W]hen it comes to looking behind and beyond 
doctrine to ask what is perpetrated through it, my own first commitment is to 
assess how women are viewed and treated in legal context.”). 
22
DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 11.  
23 For an example of such work, see generally CAROL SMITH-
ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN 
AMERICA (1984). 
24 In explaining how Derrida’s metaphysical concerns can be translated 
into law, Jack Balkin credits Dalton with developing the metaphor of 
storytelling to explain how binaries work in law: “Law tells a story about 
what people are and should be.” Balkin, supra note 10, at 762. The binaries 
of public and private, objective and subjective, and form and substance 
appear not just as doctrinal rules but as stories about how law works to 
explain and order people’s behavior and relationships.  
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like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell 
one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one 
another, and authority.”25 In pursuing this project of 
deconstructing contract law, she demonstrates how analyzing 
stories within and about legal discourse can “expose the way 
law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, favors 
certain stories and disfavors others, or even makes it 
impossible to tell certain kinds of stories.”26 In order to build 
feminism into the legal academy in a way that could be deep 
and integral, she shows how feminists can reveal hidden or 
displaced stories and tell new stories as ways of challenging 
those that dominate. For example, in telling how doctrines 
implicate the stories of relationships and not just discrete, 
atomized individuals, feminists can resuscitate buried accounts 
and construct new narratives that expose unrealized aspects or 
consequences of a particular doctrinal formulation. Through 
telling and retelling, critique and re-interpretation of law’s 
stories, and the revelation of stories hidden behind the stylized 
process of storytelling in legal discourse, Clare and other 
feminist legal academics sought to reshape through scholarship 
the meaning and experience of law. Further, recognizing that 
“those who dominate the legal forum only incompletely dictate 
the range of legitimate stories,” Clare takes from feminism the 
imperative of finding and creating “room for those who speak 
in a different voice and who can use that voice to critique the 
dominant one.”27 
To pull all these feminist strands together, Clare concludes 
with analysis of the doctrines implicated in the enforcement of 
cohabitation agreements between unmarried people. Using the 
understanding developed in the article of the doctrines of express 
and implied contract, manifestation and intent, and consideration 
and reliance, she shows how courts achieve a supposed 
resolution of arguments about how to treat these agreements. 
Her methodology applied in this setting of a particular kind of 
relationship reveals how, in the doctrinal treatment of 
                                                          
25 Dalton, supra note 3, at 999.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 999 n.3.  
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cohabitation agreements, the creation and structuring of the 
dichotomies of public and private, objective and subjective 
understanding, and form and substance serve to displace 
underlying issues about the actual relationships, the interactions of 
unmarried people who enter cohabitation agreement, and the 
stance of the state toward those agreements and those people. To 
escape from “the stranglehold” of these doctrinal arguments “on 
our thinking about concrete contractual issues,”28 Clare “bring[s] 
to life the underlying issues of power and knowledge that lie 
buried in the doctrine by focusing on the images of women and of 
human relationship that the doctrine presupposes.”29 Clare 
constructs intellectual paths to generate analysis and debate about 
“commitments and concerns central to our society” that are 
pervasive in doctrine but that doctrinal discourse keeps at a 
“stylized distance.”30 In “decoding the doctrinal formulations,” 
she fosters understanding about the real stakes for real people. 
She aims to present possibilities not just for critique of those 
particular doctrines, but for reimagining how law might be 
recast.31  
It is clear in retrospect that feminist legal scholarship across 
many different theoretical orientations and in many different 
areas of substantive law has grappled with these concerns—
regarding the connection between self and others, the 
distribution and operation of power, and the exclusion of women 
from or their marginalization in aspects of social life—that Clare 
articulated at a moment when feminist thought was transforming 
the academy generally, yet only beginning to challenge 
entrenched ways of analyzing law.32 It is also apparent that 
                                                          
28 Id. at 1095 (“By ordering the ways in which we perceive disputes, 
these [doctrinal] arguments blind us to some aspects of what the disputes are 
actually about. By helping us categorize, they encourage us to simplify in a 
way that denies the complexity, and ambiguity, of human relationships. By 
offering us the false hope of definitive resolution, they allow us to escape the 
pain, and promise, of continual reassessment and accommodation.”). 
29 Id. at 1003. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1009. 
32 The textbooks on feminist legal theory, many of which have gone 
through multiple editions, provide an entry point into this now vast 
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Clare’s identification of these questions as central to feminist 
legal thought—although they differed from the more readily 
available issues concerning equality33—generated and sustained 
further innovative inquiry.34 This work has extended feminist 
legal critique in ways seemingly remote from particular contract 
doctrines or discrete areas of law and expanded feminist legal 
analysis to create new ways to explore the interplay of law with 
the operation of gender. With Clare’s innovative work on 
contract doctrine, we were all better able to confront the weight 
of authority that appeared arrayed to resist challenges. With her 
concepts, approaches,  and analysis, we proceeded with her as 
an ally in our minds and in our hearts. 
This iconic article coupled with Clare’s other scholarship did 
not secure tenure for her at Harvard,35 just as extraordinary 
achievement has often failed to bring rewards “that would in all 
probability have fallen to the lot of equally determined and 
qualified men”;36 however, it achieved a different sort of success 
in feminist terms. It played a central role in securing for 
feminism a powerful and explicit presence in legal scholarship, 
                                                          
literature. 
33 Much early feminist legal thought, influenced by distinguished 
advocates, approached law as the site of inequality and the site for remedying 
that inequality. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s now renowned work as a 
lawyer litigating the pioneering cases challenging sex-based classifications as 
part of  the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project and as a law teacher is only the 
most widely known and influential example of this strand of early feminist 
thought. Other early feminist legal advocates and academics, along with 
Clare, developed other feminist approaches. See Dalton, supra note 6. 
34 As feminists grappled with dilemmas around the treatment of 
pregnancy in anti-discrimination law and generated new approaches in 
feminist thought in the equality debates, feminist legal academics have found 
ways to continue to create new forms of analysis for critiquing how gender 
differences in caring for others and in household responsibilities can 
contribute to exclusion from social and political life or to economic 
vulnerability. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995). 
35 Patti Doten, The Law Professor Who Sued Harvard Tells Why the 
Stack is Decked Against Women, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 36. 
36 Clare Dalton, How It Was, How It Is, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1346, 1346 
(1988).  
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fostered new forms of feminist legal analysis, prompted 
recognition and respect that have endured the continually 
changing scholarly landscape, and became a source for critical 
legal thought up to the present.37 Feminists across disciplines 
have drawn upon it,38 traditional legal scholars have had to  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 A quick citation check on Lexis reveals 370 citation references across 
legal fields, not to mention citations in many secondary sources and reprints 
in various collections. In 1996, it was listed as a most cited law review 
article of recent years. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles 
Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 774 tbl.2 (1996).  
38 See, e.g., Susanne Baer, A Different Approach to Jurisprudence? 
Feminisms in German Legal Science, Legal Cultures, and the Ambivalence of 
Law, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 282–83 n.135 (1996); Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 835 n.18 (1990) 
[hereinafter Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods]; Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender 
Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 13 n.64, 14 n.71 (1994); Dan L. 
Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 184 n.4 (2007); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice 
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
1599, 1624 n.95 (1991) [hereinafter Theory-Practice Spiral]; Beverly 
Horsburgh, Decent and Indecent Proposals in the Law: Reflections on 
Opening the Contracts Discourse to Include Outsiders, 1 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 57 (1994) (arguing that the contracts curriculum disadvantages 
law students by its insistence on total objectivity and a separateness from the 
culture in which it is situated and applying Dalton’s analysis to understanding 
how a partial or subjective view gets presented as universal); Christine A. 
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1283 
n.24, 1322 n.225 (1987); Ramona L. Paetzold, Commentary: Feminism and 
Business Law: The Essential Interconnection, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 699, 713 
n.51 (1994) (applying Dalton’s analysis to a feminist critique of commercial 
law, arguing that her analysis of the public/private duality is helpful in 
deconstructing various doctrines and the analysis of the objective/subjective 
duality reveals how questions of power dynamics get obscured); Kellye Y. 
Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 219 (1995) (applying 
Dalton’s analysis of contract law to lesbian legal theory, arguing that lesbians 
should seek to use contract rather than be used by it, by confronting the 
ambivalence and dualities). 
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acknowledge it39—even if critical of it—and scholars from other 
critical traditions have relied on it.40  
II. TELLING STORIES IN CLASS: FEMINISM IN THE LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULUM 
Clare’s work and the work of feminist legal academics  
transformed not only legal scholarship, although that 
transformation was necessary for feminism to survive and 
flourish in the legal academy. Were academic legal feminism 
confined to legal scholarship, however important scholarship 
                                                          
39 See, e.g., Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 259 (1987) (criticizing Dalton’s use of deconstruction as inconclusive 
and as failing to provide guidance on how to construct rules that better 
organize private obligations); Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of 
Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1091 (1997) (applying Dalton’s analysis to 
the legal writing curriculum in arguing that the standard models of legal 
writing promote a disjunction between writing and thought); Chad 
McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
719, 749 (1999) (in arguing for the autonomy of contract law, discusses 
Dalton’s description of the tension between objective and subjective theories 
of contract law in relationship to the dialectic between individual and 
community in Hegel); Sky Pettey, Power and Knowledge in Agreements to 
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Rights, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 927 
(1999) (using the treatment of power and knowledge in Dalton’s dichotomies 
to analyze the arbitrariness of courts’ preferences for arbitration clauses); 
Charles E. Rounds, Jr., The Common Law Is Not Just About Contracts: How 
Legal Education Has Been Short-Changing Feminism, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1185 (2009) (extending Dalton’s analysis of quasi-contract to the concepts of 
agency and trust as reflective of the ways equity’s private fiduciary 
relationships can address power and knowledge imbalances); Kenneth L. 
Schneyer, The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual Mistake, 34 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 429 (1997) (applying Dalton’s methodology to the notion of mistake in 
contract doctrine and emphasizing the role of binaries in the development of 
mutual mistake). 
40 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 25, 
104–06 (1987); Balkin, supra note 10; Robert Batey, Alienation by Contract 
in Paris Trout, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 289 (1994) (using questions posed by 
Dalton regarding the relationship between self and other to analyze the 
potential for alienation in the individualist bias of most modern conceptions 
of contract law that tends to overemphasize the threat posed by others and 
undervalue the promise of solidarity with them).  
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may be to educational institutions, it would have been little more 
than a bump in intellectual history. For feminism to alter the 
legal academy and thereby reshape understanding in the legal 
profession and in society, new understandings of law could not 
remain cabined in the realm of scholarly production; scholarly 
work had to be instantiated as curricular change. 
Having embraced the task of reframing the narratives of law 
in her own scholarly writing, Clare enthusiastically joined the 
feminist effort to reconstitute the storytelling that pervades legal 
education. Through an engaged legal education, feminist 
academics could pass on to their students an understanding of 
how law’s stories relate to the lives of women and to the core 
concerns of all people, concerns that demand the inclusion of 
women. Feminist thought had to be incorporated into the law 
school curriculum—not just as separate “women and the law” 
courses, but as part of the full range of law’s stories as they 
emerge in different courses throughout the curriculum.41 In 
1984, the Women and the Law Program at American 
University, Washington College of Law42 set out to build 
connections among feminists and others critical of dominant 
forms of legal education who often worked in isolation at their 
institutions. They sought to facilitate change in what was taught 
in classrooms and how it was taught, and, at deeper structural 
levels, to influence the structure and content of the curriculum.43  
                                                          
41 Dalton, supra note 36.  
42 The creation of the Women and the Law Program by the faculty of the 
Washington College of Law emerged from a rediscovery of the story of our 
founding in 1896 by two women, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett 
who began the only law school in the United States founded by women. Ann 
Shalleck, Report of the Women and the Law Project: Gender Bias and the 
Law School Curriculum, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 97 (1988). For full accounts 
of this history, see Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the Washington College 
of Law: The First Law School Established by Women for Women, 47 AM. U. 
L. REV. 613, 614 (1998); VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: 
WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (2001). 
43 The seeds of this current symposium honoring Clare Dalton were sown 
at the 1985 program. Feminist academics that preceded me and participated 
in this symposium were essential to conceptualizing and creating the 
workshop on Women’s Rights and the Law School Curriculum, most notably 
Elizabeth Schneider. Conversations with Liz helped produce this project, and 
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In 1985, the Women and the Law Program instituted an 
annual workshop called Women’s Rights and the Law School 
Curriculum, coordinated with the annual meetings of the 
Association of American Law Schools, designed to create a 
regularized yet distinctive feminist presence broadly accessible 
to interested faculty.44 The program continued for the remainder 
of the century.45 Clare was an enthusiastic and committed 
participant from the beginning. The first workshop “focused on 
those courses devoted primarily to examining the legal status of 
                                                          
Liz, already with significant experience in creating feminist change in 
practice and in legal academia, guided me into the existing academic feminist 
network. See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Cheryl Hanna, The Development of 
Domestic Violence as a Legal Field: Honoring Clare Dalton, 20 J.L. & 
POL’Y 343 (2012). At the 1985 workshop, my own academic work 
intersected with that of Clare, whom this symposium honors. Other 
academics from the 1985 program are participants in this symposium. 
44 Shalleck, supra note 42, at 98–99. The relationship to the AALS 
Annual Meetings changed over time as the format and structure of those 
meetings changed. For example, in the early years, the Women and the Law 
Program could be considered to be an allied organization and its workshop 
was treated as part of the programming done by those organizations. In 1986, 
the workshop presented by the Women and the Law Program was actually 
one of the AALS’s Mini-Workshops. Later, with changes in the format of the 
annual meetings, the Women and the Law Program’s annual workshops could 
not have these official or quasi-official designations, but, to facilitate 
participation, coordination of the workshops with the official meeting 
activities continued.  
45 Around this time, the AALS Annual Meeting had expanded in scope, 
including extended programming involving full-day workshops at the 
beginning of the meeting. It became increasingly difficult for those attending 
the meeting to participate in supplementary programming as the annual 
meeting itself became more extensive. In addition, as more women entered 
law teaching, the AALS Section on Women in Legal Education became 
increasingly active in developing its own programming on gender and the 
law. A specialized focus on feminism within the law school curriculum 
remains important as resistance to feminist theory and to a curriculum that 
fully incorporates theoretical, doctrinal, and clinical feminist teaching 
remains. Particularly as legal education goes through critical changes, 
sustaining efforts to retain feminist thought and practice as part of legal 
education takes on new meaning. However, the particular institutional 
structure for creating a setting for these discussions must be different.  
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women”46—partly because feminists had first claimed a presence 
in legal academia through demands, primarily by women 
students, for these courses47 and partly because these courses 
served as a base for many feminists within academia. By 1985, 
such women and the law courses had already served many 
purposes, among them operating as outposts for feminist 
thinking within the curriculum.48 From this starting point, the 
Women and the Law Program, with the second workshop the 
following year, began in earnest to expand feminist thinking into 
all aspects of law and law teaching and, therefore, into all parts 
of the curriculum.49  
Moving from specialized courses often on the margins to the 
core of legal education, the second workshop concentrated on 
the first-year curriculum. As the announcement for the second 
workshop declared, “[i]ssues affecting women permeate the law 
but are often invisible in the law school curriculum outside of 
specialized courses in women and the law.”50 It then marked as 
an historical phenomenon the efforts of those “who have begun 
to integrate this work into many courses throughout the 
curriculum.”51 The first-year curriculum, in the content of its 
courses and its methods of instruction, worked to signal what 
mattered to the development of students’ understanding of law 
and their ways of thinking about it. “Because the first year 
curriculum is basic to shaping a shared understanding throughout 
the legal profession of what the law is and how it operates, the 
program will focus on attempts to include issues about women in 
                                                          
46 Program Announcement, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., Mini-Workshop: 
Women’s Rights and the Law School Curriculum (Jan. 4, 1986) (on file with 
author). 
47 See Dalton, supra note 6, at 3–5. 
48 Id. 
49 The yearly workshop served not only as a space to share and develop 
ideas and to learn from others engaged in similar efforts, but also as a site 
for creating change. The number of women law teachers, while growing 
quickly during a period of expansion of legal education, remained relatively 
small, and feminists were a far smaller group. Situating feminist thinking in 
the curriculum, whether in specialized courses or embedded in other 
courses,, was a contested enterprise. 
50 Program Announcement, supra note 46. 
51 Id. 
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three standard first year courses: property, contracts, and 
torts.”52 
This early effort at addressing the exclusion of any explicit 
examination of the operation of gender at this formative point in 
students’ education involved asking basic questions and creating 
a broad dialogue among participants: Why did an exploration of 
gender matter in legal study? How did such inquiries affect 
students’ understanding of these areas of law? What goals did 
feminist law teachers seek to achieve in making change? What 
change was possible within the constraints of a standard first-
year curriculum? What methods were available? What challenges 
did people face? What risks did they invite? This workshop 
created a space for framing and facing these basic questions and 
began an ongoing endeavor to explore how feminist thought 
could affect the approach to the most basic of law school’s 
material. 
 In light of Clare’s scholarly work, this workshop precisely 
suited her knowledge and her commitments. Along with 
Deborah Rhode and Patricia Williams, Clare led the discussion 
on contracts. In a letter following the workshop, she described 
the meaning of the workshop for her:  
For myself, it was nothing short of thrilling to sit down 
with a group of people teaching in the contracts field, 
and compare notes and exchange suggestions about how 
to enrich our courses through a more concrete 
recognition of the women who are our students, and the 
women’s issues that for one reason and another have 
been left out of the traditional curriculum.53 
Consistent with her conviction that focusing on women 
illuminates questions regarding the most deeply embedded 
assumptions in law and the most basic ways of framing doctrinal 
questions, Clare was particularly drawn to how this project can 
“provide many more points of access to central questions about 
the role law plays in our society.”54 Clare also cautioned: “[n]ow 
the question will be whether we can collectively sustain our 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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commitment to the project and move forward.”55 The Women 
and the Law Program provided the “supporting and steering 
function”56 that aggregated the work of individuals into a 
collective project so that feminist law professors could achieve 
more than discrete and idiosyncratic victories. With this 1986 
workshop, the Women and the Law Program took a critical, 
albeit initial, step of “bringing us into touch with each other.”57 
To incorporate feminist ideals into the first-year curriculum, 
feminist academics needed to develop teaching materials that at 
least acknowledged, even if they did not fully embrace, the 
emergence of feminist approaches to and insights about legal 
thought. While a textbook with women’s names on the cover did 
not guarantee feminist perspectives, the near exclusion of 
women from authorship of the central materials shaping the 
story of the law that first-year students encountered revealed the 
daunting project of challenging legal education that feminists 
faced. At that time, with rare exceptions,58 major casebooks in 
first-year subjects did not include women authors. The three 
fields of contracts, torts, and property on which the workshop 
focused had no women authors. In addition, whoever the 
authors, no texts included explicitly feminist perspectives nor 
offered the feminist critiques emerging in the literature of law 
journals. Feminist academics knew that if in first-year 
classrooms only feminist law professors told counter-stories of 
the law that contained women’s experiences, ones that operated 
as narratives of resistance to the text, they and their accounts 
would be discounted as partial, biased, marginal—or at best 
subsidiary. 
Just as feminists had to publish their legal theories in law 
reviews, they also needed to appear in the authoritative material 
of the texts presented to students as embodying the corpus of the 
law, particularly the texts of first-year courses, which appeared 
as the most fundamental. The narrative of law told through the 
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & PAUL D. CARRINGTON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (2d 
ed. 1977). 
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text needed to encompass feminist thought. Only with concerted 
effort would this domain, just as that of scholarly writing, allow 
entry to subversive accounts. Just as the academy viewed 
Clare’s scholarship with suspicion, feminists who challenged the 
standard presentation of material in the first year risked skeptical 
responses from colleagues and students. Clare and other 
feminists promoted exchange and experimentation that could 
produce different materials. Over time these efforts could yield 
fully developed texts. Clare saw that the Women and the Law 
Program could help feminist academics “develop materials for 
our own and others’ use” and explore when and how they might 
“supplement a traditional casebook,” or, at some later time, 
“provide a complete substitute.”59 
While the first-year curriculum continued as a focus of the 
Women and the Law Program through its annual workshops, the 
program also pursued other entry points into the law school 
curriculum, identifying those that at this point in history 
appeared amenable to change. While the established 
curriculum’s weight and solidity were formidable, women 
students were flooding into law schools after years of 
exclusion.60 Many of these students had the capacity and 
motivation “to exert some political muscle on behalf of other 
women, if they will,”61 and they had at their disposal the 
“growing body of empirical research into gender issues, and the 
growing body of formal and informal feminist and gender 
theory.”62 These factors aligned to create the potential “that 
professional cultures themselves will begin to change in ways 
responsive to women’s perspectives and experiences.”63 But 
these developments created only the possibility of change. The 
Women and the Law Program worked consistently with feminist 
legal academics to identify and foster strategies for creating a 
                                                          
59 Letter from Clare Dalton, Professor of Law, Northeastern University 
School of Law, to author (Feb. 10, 1986) (on file with author). 
60 Dalton, supra note 36, at 1355 (citing Miriam Slater & Penina Migdal 
Glazer, Prescriptions for Professional Survival, DAEDALUS, Fall 1987, at 
119, 132). 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
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different curriculum. As Clare stated, “[w]omen too solitary to 
count on the support of other women, women too nervous about 
their vulnerabilities as women to take the risk involved in 
identifying politically with other women, will find it difficult to 
provide that guidance.”64 As the workshops continued to explore 
multiple facets of feminist work in the curriculum, participants 
found support and guidance in this collective project. 
After Harvard denied Clare tenure and she won a significant 
settlement in her sex-discrimination lawsuit,65 she moved to 
Northeastern where she expanded and broadened her efforts to 
transform the law school curriculum. She continued to integrate 
these efforts into the collective work of the Women and the Law 
Program. In 1992, at the sixth annual workshop on Women’s 
Rights and the Law School Curriculum, Teaching about the 
Battering of Women: Women’s Experiences, Legal Responses 
and the Educational Project,66 Clare discussed two broad efforts 
among colleagues to change first-year stories of law that 
appeared in the curriculum: designing a torts class around 
domestic violence issues and using domestic violence to teach 
various subjects.67 As in her previous work, she looked to 
experiences shared among many women, the experiences of 
domestic violence, as part of the material for the new stories in 
the first year. Clare and her colleagues grounded both projects 
to change the traditional narratives of the first year in the 
dynamics of relationships that affected the lives of many women 
in many ways.  
The choice of this topic related to Clare’s work on founding 
and shaping the Domestic Violence Institute at Northeastern.68 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 Deborah L. Rhode, Litigating Discrimination: Lessons from the Front 
Lines, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 340–41 (2012). 
66 Program Announcement, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., Mini-Workshop: 
Teaching about the Battering of Women: Women’s Experiences, Legal 
Responses and the Educational Project (Jan. 6, 1992) (on file with author). 
67 Other presenters were Elizabeth Schneider and Margaret Mahoney. Id. 
68 As part of the settlement of her sex discrimination lawsuit against 
Harvard, at the center of which was her article, Clare obtained Harvard’s 
funding for the Domestic Violence Institute. Alice Dembner, Harvard Law 
Ends Bias Suit by Agreeing on Institute, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1993, 
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Addressing domestic violence throughout the different subjects 
of the first year and within various doctrinal formulations 
exposed how discrete legal categories inadequately contain the 
multiple aspects of people’s experience and relationships—a 
project fundamental to all Clare’s work. Clare and her 
colleagues proceeded with complementary strategies: the first 
made the social reality of domestic violence central to the 
exploration of several doctrinal categories throughout all the 
sections of the basic torts class; the second used domestic 
violence as a topic for analysis across different subjects—
criminal law, torts, and contract law, for example—that 
routinely compartmentalize people’s experiences and students’ 
understanding of how law works in discrete neat packages.  
In the first project, the redesign of the torts course reflected 
how feminist principles can begin to transform the culture of 
legal education. In shaping the course, Clare and her colleagues 
did not want to make domestic violence merely an interesting, 
even gripping, example of a doctrinal point; feminists in law 
schools had long criticized the exploitation in texts and in 
classroom hypotheticals of scenarios in which women suffer 
profound harm. To avoid treating domestic violence as just a 
random, convenient topic or sensationalizing violence against 
women, the torts faculty adopted several approaches. First, in 
the torts class, discussion of domestic violence recurred within 
three doctrinal areas: the no-duty rule in negligence, self-defense 
rules in intentional torts, and immunity rules within the context 
of governmental action and within the family. Faculty connected 
the exploration in each doctrinal area to the others, showing how 
themes, such as the public/private distinction, appeared across 
doctrines and were used to justify doctrinal resolutions. Second, 
exploration of the issues implicated in situations of domestic 
violence went beyond doctrinal or policy debates. Classes 
explored the social contexts within which domestic violence 
occurs and the different meanings it has, the systemic issues that 
affect the legal treatment of domestic violence, and the work of 
advocates in devising legal strategies to address both systemic 
failures and harm to individuals. Third, professors presented 
                                                          
(Metro), at 11.  
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issues of battering not only through legal texts, but also with 
materials that could make social contexts meaningful in 
understanding the interaction of the legal world and the social 
world.69 
With this careful structure in place, Clare and her colleagues 
also developed teaching methods that reflected the messages they 
sought to convey. For example, they made the interactions 
among the students in the class central to the teaching mission 
and the teaching design. Knowing that “many students in the 
room . . . had violence touch their lives,” faculty “design[ed] 
experiences at the beginning of the year that alert[ed] students to 
the issues that [would] arise in class.”70 In addition, they 
anticipated and planned ways to structure classroom discussions 
that acknowledged “the presence and the power of the anger 
evoked” in the discussions, while including discussion of the 
harm to men as well as women when battering occurs.71 To 
include students’ experiences and feelings in the pedagogy of the 
class was to acknowledge how lawyers are connected to the law 
they practice and students are connected to the material they 
learn. People in cases are not abstract legal subjects, and 
lawyers are not abstract legal advocates. As Clare sought to 
displace the autonomous, objective legal subject at the center of 
liberal legal thought, she and her colleagues devised ways to 
reconstruct the law school classroom with students and their 
experiences central to the educational inquiry.  
 In the second project, all professors in first-year courses 
collaborated to devote a day to domestic violence, demonstrating 
that issues of domestic violence transcend subject matter, with 
                                                          
69 Social science literature about domestic violence, descriptions of how 
courts treat different kinds of cases involving domestic violence, and personal 
narratives of attempts to use the legal system in situations involving battering 
are examples of the types of materials that provided critical context for 
considering and assessing how legal doctrine frames and resolves complex 
aspects of social life. 
70 Women and the Law Project’s Discussion Group at the 1992 AALS 
Annual Meeting, AALS WOMEN & L. SEC. NEWSL. (Am. Ass’n of Law Sch., 
Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Women and the Law Project’s 
Discussion Group]. 
71 Id. 
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each subject area limited in its capacity to address the complex 
social reality of partner abuse. This project, like Clare’s work 
on contract doctrine,72 critiqued how legal structures constrict 
fundamental questions of self-definition and of relationships, but 
situated that analysis within a particular, pervasive, deeply 
troubling part of the social world and placed it at the center of 
inquiry in the first-year curriculum. The faculty devised small 
group exercises that enabled students to participate in activities 
through which they could, at least in the constrained and 
artificially limited setting of a simulation, experience aspects of 
the real-world meaning and consequences of the legal stories 
about domestic violence. 
The power of Clare’s account at the 1992 workshop came 
only partially from the particular initiatives she described. 
Rather, the workshop wove together her experiments in change 
with the compelling stories of other feminist academics working 
to create new forms of legal education through sustained, 
contextualized treatment of this one aspect of women’s 
experience. The multiple accounts of disrupting the standard 
format of law school classes expanded the imaginations of law 
teachers about manageable, effective ways to bring feminist 
thought and teaching into the curriculum and increased 
confidence and desire to undertake similar experiments.73 
Perhaps the greatest tribute to Clare’s work at the site of law 
school teaching and curriculum is that pedagogical practices such 
as hers and those of the other feminist academics who joined in 
the annual workshops on Women’s Rights and the Law School 
curriculum now seem normal, regular parts of an expanded 
vision of legal education.74 Specialized courses abound, even if 
not evenly distributed across law schools.75 Many upper-level 
offerings76 and clinical courses77 routinely give serious attention 
                                                          
72 See Dalton, supra note 3, at 999–1000. 
73 Women and the Law Project’s Discussion Group, supra note 70.  
74 Examples of these teaching innovations have been presented at 
Professional Development Programs of the AALS. 
75 For example, Women and the Law, Sex-Based Discrimination, 
Feminist Jurisprudence, Battered Women and the Law, and Reproductive 
Rights appear with some frequency across legal education.  
76 For example, courses at many schools in employment, education, 
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to gender, and courses examining a range of critical theories 
include feminist analyses.78 At the same time, feminism has not 
swept away dominant structures and forms of thought from legal 
education. These remain, but less firmly in place and more 
susceptible to critique and reconstruction than when Clare 
entered legal academia more than thirty years ago.  
III. CREATING THE NORTHEASTERN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
INSTITUTE 
Clare’s move to Northeastern and the monetary settlement 
she obtained in her claim against Harvard79 afforded her another 
opportunity to transform law and legal education through 
feminist thought and action. Supported partially by the Harvard 
funds, Clare worked with others, most notably Lois Kanter, to 
establish the Northeastern Domestic Violence Institute.80 The 
Institute was a feminist clinical program at the intersection of the 
                                                          
immigration, civil rights, human rights, criminal law, and family law address 
issues involving analysis of gender. 
77 For example, specialized clinics in women and the law, domestic 
violence, and sex discrimination appear regularly among a law school’s 
clinical offerings. Clinics addressing lawyering across many spheres of law 
and practice—whether through specialized focus on areas such as 
immigration, human rights, tax, intellectual property, or disability rights or 
through general approaches to lawyering, such as civil practice, community 
lawyering, or community economic development—often give substantial 
attention to questions of law and practice that pose issues related to gender, 
race, inequality, and multiple forms of exclusion. See generally Margaret 
Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical 
Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 161 (2005). 
78 For example, courses in critical race theory or sexuality and law 
routinely explore how gender operates in conjunction with other structures of 
exclusion, discrimination, and subordination. 
79 See Leigh Goodmark, Clinical Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and 
Goals of Domestic Violence Clinics, the Legal System, and the Students 
Caught in the Middle, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 301 (2012); Schneider & Hanna, 
supra note 43, at 344–45. 
80 See generally Lois H. Kanter, V. Pualani Enos & Clare Dalton, 
Northeastern’s Domestic Violence Institute: The Law School Clinic as an 
Integral Partner in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic 
Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 359 (2001). 
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law school and the community. Through advocacy, education, 
research in the community, and representation of women in 
violent relationships, the Institute provided legal education in 
which learning and understanding of law proceeded from 
students’ immersion in and reflection on the social world of 
women who experienced abuse and the legal institutions and 
practices established to address that abuse. Through the 
educational structures of the Institute, students could learn to 
identify the implicit and explicit images of women in violent 
relationships, compare those images to their clients’ experiences 
and understandings, and challenge the ways that the law and the 
legal system operate to cast women in violent intimate 
relationships as victims lacking in knowledge and judgment 
about their lives. They could engage in forms of legal practice 
that made options for acting beyond the limited possibilities 
enshrined in the legal process available to their clients. As with 
all that Clare did, the power of the Institute’s approach came 
from its engagement with others in a collective effort to 
transform law, legal institutions, and lawyering through feminist 
thought and action.  
As Clare was developing the Institute at Northeastern, 
clinical faculty—like feminist faculty—were challenging 
traditional visions of law, as well as forms and methods of legal 
education.81 Concepts and approaches shaped by these two 
overlapping groups of faculty drew on similar themes.82 The 
Domestic Violence Institute belonged to both projects. 
Proceeding from the early work of Clare and those in clinical 
education, the pedagogical structures and practices of such 
                                                          
81 Ann Shalleck & Muneer Ahmad, Clinical Thought: Investigating the 
Contours, Urges and Trajectories (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author); AN ORAL HISTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, PART I: SEEDS 
OF CHANGE (2006). 
82 See generally Goldfarb, Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 38. 
Feminists explicitly brought together clinical theory and feminist theory 
regarding domestic violence. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without 
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of 
Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Ann Shalleck, 
Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and 
Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 
1019 (1997). 
 The Feminist Academic Challenge to Legal Education 387 
clinics now aim to generate understanding of how law, 
lawyering, and legal institutions can both create possibilities for 
remedying harms to women who experience abuse, and also 
constrain how law and society address the experiences of 
domestic violence.83 In the educational activities of the Institute, 
as in other domestic violence clinics, students’ understanding of 
law grows from relationships with women struggling with the 
ambiguities in and complexity of their relationships with others. 
As advocates for these women, students learned to incorporate 
into client representation the possibilities of using law to help 
women address violence in their relationships, while recognizing 
its many problematic and harmful dimensions. In their 
representation and their other work in the community, students 
encounter the distortions and limits of law in individual cases 
and in systemic practices. They see how law can force a woman 
into leaving an intimate partner, even if that action poses 
dangers she understands better than others. They also learn how 
law can require a woman to cooperate in seeking incarceration 
fir a partner, even if jail harms all members of her family, or 
can fail to secure the most basic forms of immediate help with 
jobs or income at a time of grave danger. With this 
understanding of law, students learn to expand their vision of the 
work of the lawyer to include engagement with institutions in 
the community that can be resources for individual women and 
can be important in creating systemic change.84  
                                                          
83 See Goodmark, supra note 79, for an analysis of how feminist thought 
and practice about domestic violence are reflected in this form of legal 
education. See Schneider & Hanna, supra note 43, for a discussion of the 
evolution of feminist approaches to violence against women since Clare and 
others established the Institute. 
84 Clinical academics analogously have structured legal pedagogy to 
highlight the relationship of individual and community. See generally, e.g., 
Sameer Asher, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 
455 (2008); Susan Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, 
Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 
469; Juliet Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice 
Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 333 (2009); Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, A Battered Women’s Rights 
Clinic: Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving 
Vision of Lawyering that Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH. U. J. 
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Clare made the Institute her central priority at the moment of 
transition not just from Harvard to Northeastern, but from 
institutional rejection to approval, and from a focus on doctrinal 
formulations to law in the context of the world of legal practice 
and social life. In her development, she expressed the central 
commitments that had guided her work since she wrote about 
contract doctrine: “how we should conceive relationships 
between people, how we should understand and police the 
boundary between self and other.”85 She wrote about how the 
“inherent indeterminacy”86 of law and legal argumentation can 
reveal these issues but cannot resolve them, and how we need to 
“reflect directly on the concrete aspects of social life that create 
the disputes and shape their resolution.”87 At all the critical sites 
within the legal academy, she integrated these commitments into 
her work. 
As a feminist legal academic, Clare experienced the 
importance of connection to other feminists and to feminism. 
She understood the different aspects of her work—as a scholar, a 
teacher, and a designer of curriculum—to be part of the task of 
feminist transformation of legal understanding, legal practice, 
and legal education. In the realm of legal scholarship, her 
writing helped to enrich the legal inquiry of feminist academics 
and to make the scholarly enterprise more inclusive of and 
accessible to all women. With each use of her work by others, 
her writing validated the importance of the development of 
feminist thought to all legal thought. But the very success of her 
article on contract doctrine exhibited the reality that individual 
achievement on its own will not bring about change. Merit alone 
could not secure tenure in a world of structural discrimination. 
However, the fruits of her battle against that discrimination 
through her litigation against Harvard secured the funding for a 
                                                          
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 211–13 (1992); Susan Bryant & Elliott Milstein, 
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85 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1006. 
86 Id. at 1007. 
87 Id. at 1003.  
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Domestic Violence Institute based on feminist understanding, 
constructed with other feminists and supported by an institution 
in which feminism could flourish. Her own life thus reflected 
her analysis of the lives of other women who had sought 
professional fulfillment in worlds within which women were 
subordinate.88 Clare wrote that women needed to remain 
cognizant of “the professional commitment to meritocracy as 
containing a substantial element of window-dressing.”89 She 
therefore cautioned that women should 
not accept the invitation to reinterpret experiences of 
prejudice and discrimination as experiences of personal 
inadequacy. They should not imagine that superperformance 
will be an amulet against such experiences. They should 
not accept the argument that women “choose” 
subordinate professional roles . . . without attention to 
the way these “choices” are culturally constrained.90 
In the multiplicity of its meanings, Clare’s contract article 
reminds us that even today, more than twenty-five years after its 
publication, feminist legal thought has an ambiguous and unstable 
place in the legal academy, simultaneously honored and 
marginalized, always in need of grounding in feminist support 
and action. Just as Clare urged, feminist legal academics continue 
to engage in collective effort not just to inhabit but to transform 
legal thought and legal education. Absent this grounding, Clare 
warned that women will be “stopped short of their full 
potential.”91 When they can “locate the problem firmly outside 
themselves,” however, and can feel “comfortable working 
politically with other women and sympathetic men, to combat the 
forces arrayed against them,” they will not have to bear the 
“personal cost” of the “denial of some of the realities of their 
lives.”92 With her guidance, feminist academics continue to build 
on the legacy that Clare explicitly and munificently bequeathed to 
them. They work in virtually every area of law both to continue 
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to elaborate the meaning of feminist legal theory in all its 
diversity93 and to bring insights from feminist analysis to realms 
of legal education still resistant to feminist questions.94  
CONCLUSION 
As we honor Clare’s work with this symposium on 
Challenging Boundaries in Legal Education, we see the 
trajectory of feminists and feminism in the legal academy. We 
identify the moments when Clare, always along with others, 
created new visions of law and legal education and new 
practices to make those visions real. Feminist academics, along 
with those from other critical traditions,95 have brought about 
something of a renewal of legal education. While partial, 
tentative, and fraught with contradictions, the multiple changes 
in legal education and broad discussion of the exciting 
possibilities96 emerged in their current form largely because of 
the efforts of committed academics—feminists prominent among 
them—to remake the entire culture of legal education. This 
transformation creates not just possibilities for richer and more 
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engaged educational experiences, but also for a legal profession 
and a society that can deploy law better to address 
“commitments and concerns central to our society.”97 
 
                                                          
97 Dalton, supra note 3, at 1009. 
